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7I. Introduction1
This chapter is, among other things, taken up with discussing the sources of what has now
become generally known as “the resource-based perspective on strategy” (henceforth, “the
RBP”).   Although the chapter should have some appeal to intellectual historians, it is not an
exercise in the doctrinal history of the strategy discipline per se.  The primary motivation of
the chapter rather is to understand the present condition of the RBP, and to speculate on its
possible future paths of development, in terms of the historical conditioning that some crucial
contributions have imposed on the perspective.  In other words, it is an examination of
intellectual path-dependence2 in the context of strategic management and the theory of the
firm, but also an attempt to briefly suggest how resource-based scholars may avoid some less
fortunate future paths of development.  Thus, one the general level the chapter sets the stage
for much of the discussion in the rest of this book, and links directly up with the argument of
some of the other chapters (particularly Metcalfe’s and Roberts’) by arguing that the RBP
should take more seriously its Penrosian heritage and adopt an explicit process mode of
analysis.
It is well-known that in fact the RBP is conventionally (e.g., Mahoney and Pandian 1992;
Knudsen 1996) traced back to the seminal, but for a long time neglected, contribution by
Edith Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm.  However, in its modern manifestation
the RBP may conveniently (if admittedly also somewhat arbitrarily)  be dated to the year 1984,
which is the year of publication of Birger Wernerfelt’s “A Resource-Based View of the Firm”, and
Richard Rumelt’s “Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm”.  These papers were quickly
followed by a spate of important work by such writers as Barney, Montgomery, Dierickx, Cool,
Amit and others3 and the last decade of strategy research is difficult to characterize as anything
else than a wildfire of interest in resources, capabilities, competencies, etc.  Thus, in little more
than a decade, the RBP has emerged as arguably the dominant contemporary approach to strategy
(content) research − indeed, as perhaps the new orthodoxy in mainstream strategy research.  The
                                               
1
  I am grateful to Professor Jay B. Barney for valuable comments on an earlier draft.  The present chapter is
essentially an extension of the reasoning in Foss (1996a), and repeats some of the insights and conclusions
of that paper.
2
  In analogy to the work of David (1985) and Arthur (1989).
3
 The important contributions are reprinted in Foss (1997).
8perspective’s appeal to academics may be rationalized by its relative4 ability to combine analytical
rigor with apparent managerial relevance, and doing so more successfully than alternative
approaches (Foss 1996b).
However, as has recently been pointed out (Schulze 1994; Mahoney 1995; Foss 1996a), the
approach is far from being homogenous.  As an illustration,  one may compare the enormously
successful 1990 Harvard Business Review paper, “The Core Competence of the Corporation” by
C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, and the 1982 Bell Journal of Economics paper, “Uncertain
Imitability: An Analysis of Interfirm Differences Under Competition”, by Stephen Lippman and
Richard Rumelt.  Nothing seems to relate these two papers, apart from a shared emphasis on firm
resources − everything else is different −, and it is not just that they are written for different
audiences.  However, both papers are usually seen as important contributions to the RBP.
Generalizing this observation, we may point to a broader schism in contemporary resource-based
thought of which these two papers are merely representatives; a schism that is both thematic and
disciplinary.  Thus, while those resource-based contributions that have taken their cues from
Prahalad and Hamel are “soft”, in these that they are taken up with issues learning, innovation,
competence building, entrepreneurship, vision, etc. in a non-formal way, there is also a set of
resource-based contributions that explicitly rely on equilibrium economics and, perhaps
accordingly, do not treat the more dynamic phenomena that are centerstage in the “softer”
approach.  Instead, the interest centers around the distribution of returns in economic equilibrium.
In this chapter, I shall talk about ”Mark I RBP” (the equilibrium, economics oriented version) and
“Mark II RBP” (the process oriented version).
Rather than further diagnosing this schism, I shall in this chapter dig a little deeper and be
concerned with (some of) its causes.  The claim here is that ultimately, we need to look at the
pre-history of the RBP in order to understand present tensions within the RBP, and in order
to speculate on how the perspective may develop in the future.   Many contributions have
discussed the pre-history of the RBP5 and there is considerable consensus on the issue.
According to this consensus, the basic resource-based insights were present in the work of
particularly Edith Penrose (1959), but also to some extent in the work of Philip Selznick
                                               
4
  Relative to other streams in strategic management.
5
 Conner (1991) is without any doubt the most meticulous discussion; see also Mahoney and Pandian (1992),
Foss (1996a), and Knudsen (1996).
9(1957) and Alfred Chandler (1962).  More impetus was given in the work of Kenneth
Andrews (1971), but then resource-based ideas were temporarily swept aside by an all-
consuming interest in industry analysis as a foundation for strategy.  The revival of those
resource-based ideas that had been present in what is essentially the mainstream of American
strategy thinking were then undertaken in the 1980s by the younger resource-based theorists
mentioned above.
In this chapter I link up with this received view by discussing the work of Penrose as an important
source of inspiration for the RBP.  However, I add to the received view by discussing the work
of UCLA-economist, Harold Demsetz as an influence on par with that of Penrose.6  In fact,
Demsetz’ influence may have been even stronger on the emerging RBP than Penrose’s and
also more direct: it is almost certain that Demsetz influenced the early important resource-
based theorists, such as Rumelt and Barney, through their shared institutional affiliation with
the University of California, Los Angeles, and many of Demsetz’ ideas are directly reflected
in the work of these important scholars.
However, more than strict doctrinal history is involved: I also argue that the Demsetzian
influence has tended to lock-in the intellectual development of the RBP.  Specifically,
Demsetz’ influence meant that the basic discipline underlying the development in the early
1980s of the RBP was equilibrium economics, albeit of a sophisticated kind.  This has
resulted in the RBP (Mark I), exemplified by the work of Rumelt and Barney.  In many
respects, the RBP (Mark I) is in conflict with the RBP (Mark II), exemplified by the work of
Prahalad and Hamel, which I here reconstruct as manifesting the process oriented (or, if you
like, evolutionary) influence stemming from Penrose.7
In order to place the discussion in context, I begin by providing a brief sketch of the
resource-based approach(es) (section II), before moving on (in section III) to argue that
                                               
6
  Admittedly, the Demsetz influence is less visible than the Penrose influence; for example, Demsetz is being
quoted less by RBP scholars.  Thus, the admittedly speculative part of my story is that Demsetz to some
extent has been a “sleeping partner” in the evolution of the RBP.
7
  Because I want to concentrate on the Demsetz vs Penrose story, I disregard the other possible reasons for
intra-RBP heterogeneity, such as the greater practice connection of the RBP (Mark II) as contrasted with
the more academic orientation of the RBP (Mark I).
  
See Spender (1993) for interesting reflections on the
history of the strategy field that highlights the tensions between academic ambitions and relevance for
managerial practice.   Similarly, I disregard other possibly important influences, such as the work of
Schumpeter and the Austrians.
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• not only Penrose, but also Harold Demsetz should be seen as a dominant source of
inspiration for RBP scholars,
• that these two crucial influences hold different and even conflicting views of the
economic process, and
• that they helped found different research areas and research approaches within the
RBP.
Based on this discussion, it is then (in section IV) argued that
• the conflicting legacies of Penrose and Demsetz threathen the coherence of the RBP,
• that a central problem in the RBP is the lack of understanding of the process of
resource-creation which tends to give the perspective a retrospective character, but
• that work on technological innovation and change, framed in the broader theoretical
context of Austrian and evolutionary economics, may help remedy this shortcoming, as
argued by several contributions to this book.
II. The Resource-Based Approach:
A Brief Sketch
Simplifying somewhat, we may say that there are two main research themes in the RBP, namely,
first, analyses of the conditions for sustained competitive advantage, and, second,  diversification
studies.  They are presented seriatim in the following.
A. Competitive Advantage
The resource-based analysis of (sustained) competitive advantages may be seen as  starting out
from two basic empirical generalizations, namely that 1) there are systematic differences across
firms in the extent to which they control resources that are necessary for implementing strategies,
and 2) that these differences are relatively stable. The basic structure of the RBP emerges when
these two generalizations are combined with fundamental assumptions that are to a large extent
derived from economics.  Among these assumptions are that 3) differences in firms’ resource
endowments cause performance differences, and 4) that firms seek to increase their economic
performance.
11
The overall managerial implication is that firms may secure a strong performance by building or
otherwise acquiring certain endowments of resources.   More generally, the overall objective that
informs the RBP is to account for the creation, maintenance and renewal of competitive
advantage in terms of the resource side of firms.  The fundamentals of the resource-based
analysis of the conditions for sustained competitive advantage are basically simple (Peteraf 1993):
in order that resources yield a sustained competitive advantage, they should meet four basic
criteria:
• Heterogeneity − i.e., in lieu of efficiency differences across resources, there cannot be any
differences in the rents firm earn (in fact, there cannot be any rents at all).  This indicates that
resource heterogeneity, leading to efficiency differences and therefore rents, is a basic necessary
condition for competitive advantage.8
• Ex ante limits to competition − i.e., resources have to be acquired at a price below their
discounted net present value in order to yield rents.  Otherwise future rents will be fully absorbed
in the price paid for the resource (Demsetz 1973;  Barney 1986; Rumelt 1987).
• Ex post limits to competition − i.e., it should be difficult or impossible for competitors to imitate
or substitute rent-yielding resources.  As Dierickx and Cool (1989) clarify, there are in successful
firms a number of mechanisms at work that often makes it hard for competitors to copy the
sources of competitive advantage of a successful firm. For example, there may be “causal
ambiguity”, which means that competitors confront difficulties ascertaining precisely how a bundle
of resource contributes to success.
• Imperfect mobility − i.e., the resource should be relatively specific to the firm.  Otherwise, the
superior bargaining position that is obtained from not being tied to a firm can be utilized by the
resource (or the resource’s owner) to appropriate the rent (or, at least a large portion of the rent)
that the resource helps create.   In other words, the key question to ask here is, Who captures
value from the resource, and how may the firm capture more value from this resource?
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 An alternative formulation − put forward by Barney (1991) − is that with homogenous resources, all firms can
implement the same strategies; hence, no firm can differentiate itself from other firms, and nobody will have a
competitive advantage.
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Several things are noteworthy about this basic analysis.  First, it explicitly draws on economics,
more precisely on basic, equilibrium price theory.9 For example, in connection with ex ante
limits or barriers to competition, these limits are evaluated relative to a full information,
competitive equilibrium (Barney 1986). It is clearly the case that equilibrium assumptions play a
key role in many contributions to the RBP. This is the case in Peteraf (1993), in which the concept
of Ricardian rent is developed using efficiency differences across firms under competitive
equilibrium as a benchmark. And it is also the case in Barney (1986), in which the finance
concepts of strong and weak efficiency are (implicitly) used to elucidate the reasoning behind the
concepts of perfect factor markets and factor market imperfections. Indeed, the very concept of
sustained competitive advantage is often defined in equilibrium terms: it is that advantage which
lasts after all attempts at imitation have ceased. This has the implication, unfortunately, that
sustained competitive advantage has no meaning outside equilibrium. Second, the above analysis
actually tells us very little of direct value for understanding the more dynamic and managerial
aspects of competitive advantage, such as how to build new resources, coordinate existing ones,
etc.
B. Diversification
Although the basic story is much refined now, the basic RBP analysis is not novel, as Penrose
(1959) essentially laid the foundations here (her work is discussed in more detail later).  What is
new relative to Penrose, however, is 1) the point that diversification may in turn help building new
resources (cf. Markides and Williamson 1994), 2) the insight that it is necessary to bring
transaction costs into the story (Teece 1980), 3) the more rigorous form the argument has now
taken, and 4) the many empirical tests that have been carried out (e.g., Montgomery and
Wernerfelt 1988).
Diversification studies may arguably be where the resource-based approach has had its greatest
impact.  The commonly accepted theory of diversification, both in economics and strategy
research, is roughly the resource-based theory (Montgomery 1994).  The basic story is the
following one: firms gradually accumulate excess resources as a (non-intended) consequence of
their normal operations.  Tasks become routinized and this releases human resources, such as
managerial resources; some physical resources are indivisible, which means that may not be fully
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 More specifically, as I later argue, it is the Chicago-UCLA brand of price theory on which the basic resource-based
analysis of sustained competitive advantage is based.
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exploited in their present use; etc.  In principle, these resources could be traded over markets;
however, the presence of transaction costs will often hinder trading excess resources.  As Teece
(1980) clarifies, this is particularly likely to be the case if the resources in question are knowledge
resources.  An important implication of the theory is that firms earn decreasing average rents as
they diversify more widely (Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988).
C. Varieties of the Resource-Based Approach: Equilibrium or Evolution?
As already indicated, there is substantial evidence − such as the absence of terminological
agreement − that the RBP is far from being a coherent perspective.  It is a set of contributions
published over the last approximately 15 years (plus some important precursors to these
contributions) that share important basic themes.  But, apart from that, the contributions that may
be seen as constituting the RBP are undeniably quite heterogeneous in terms of, for example,
which disciplines they draw on (economics, sociology, psychology, decision theory).
The argument here is that it makes sense to distinguish two different versions of the RBP, the
RBP (Mark I) and the RBP (Mark II), and that existing differences between these are to a very
large extent a matter of whether one seeks to address and include dynamic − or better,
evolutionary − factors, or instead relies on standard economic theory.10  It is a choice, in short,
between equilibrium or evolution; “evolution” and “evolutionary” here being meant to refer to
whether such concepts as irreversibility (e.g., in the form of path-dependence and learning) and
novelty (e.g., in the form of unanticipated innovations) are included in the analysis at some level
(cf. Loasby 1991; Foss, Knudsen and Montgomery 1995).11
While various dynamic phenomena (innovation, organizational learning, resource-accumulation,
competence-building, the development of mental models of the management team, etc.) come first
in the RBP (Mark II) (Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Hamel and Heene 1994; Pisano and Teece
1994), statics comes first in the RBP (Mark I).   That is to say, in the latter approach one begins
by clarifying and examining the conditions that must obtain in order for resources to yield rents in
equilibrium (e.g., Barney (1986) or Peteraf (1993) or Wernerfelt (1995)), before going on to
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  The “two resource-based approaches”-argument is also made in Schulze (1994), Mahoney (1995),  and
Foss (1996a), who all point to the static/dynamic distinction in rationalizing this argument. It should be
mentioned that while all evolutionary theories are dynamic, not all dynamic theories are evolutionary (for
example, economic growth theory is not evolutionary).
11
  The use of the word “evolutionary” in this paper is deliberately broad, and does not carry any necessary
connotations to the biological analogies that were so harshly criticized by Penrose (1952).
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discuss, for example, the renewal of competitive advantage (supposing one ever gets this far).
Thus, process issues enter subsequently, or are simply suppressed.  In the RBP (Mark II),
equilibrium is at most a theoretical benchmark; an abstraction without any apparent practical
value.
If this analysis is correct, resource-based scholars would at least to some extent seem to be caught
on the horn of a dilemma − should one emphasize realism and perhaps sacrifice some analytical
rigor and clarity, or vice versa?  − and to confront difficult questions, such as the issue of how to
combine process analysis (including firm growth) and sustainability of competitive advantage.  In
the next section, I explore some sources of the schism in resource-based thought by looking at the
contributions of two crucial precursors of the RBP, Edith Penrose and Harold Demsetz.
III. Two Crucial Precursors:
  Penrose and Demsetz
A. Edith Penrose on the Theory of the Growth of the Firm
It is a commonplace that many of the great works of economics have been interpreted in
widely different ways, and normally in both a mainstream, neoclassical way and in a non-
neoclassical way.12  This is also the case with Edith Tilton Penrose’s (1914 -1996) major
work, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm.  Thus, Paul Rubin (1973) rationally
reconstructed Penrose’s work in terms of finding the best solution to the dynamic
optimization problem of balancing the development of new resources (using existing
resources) and the use of existing resources directly in production.  On the other hand,
Penrose’s work has been heavily cited by heterodox economists (e.g., Loasby 1991)13, and
her foreword to the third edition of The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (published in
1995) leaves little doubt that her sympathies were with more heterodox strands of
economics.  As she noted there: “One of the primary assumptions of the theory of the growth
of firms is that ‘history matters’; growth is essentially an evolutionary process and based on
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  Think of the work of Marx, Marshall and Keynes, to mention just the most obvious.
13
  It has even been argued that the economist whose work lies closest in many respects to Penrose’s is the
idiosyncratic, but often brilliant Thorstein Veblen (Foss 1998).
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the cumulative growth of collective knowledge, in the context of a purposive firm”
(1959[1995]: xiii).
The basic reasoning of 1959 book is very well-known and shall be only briefly summarized:
Firms are collections of productive resources that are organized in an administrative
framework which partly determines the amount and type of services that the resources yield.
As they go along with their productive operations, firms − in Penrose particularly the
management team − obtain increased knowledge of the services that may be obtained from
resources,. The (related) results of such learning processes is, first, the expansion of the
firm’s “productive opportunity set” (the opportunities that the firm’s management team can
see and can take advantage of) and, second, the release of managerial excess resources that
can be put to use in other, mostly related, business areas.   Since the opportunity costs of
excess resources are zero, there will be a strong internal incentive for such diversification.
Because the firm’s expansion to a large extent builds on its “inherited” resources, and
because there “... is a close relation between the various kinds of resources with which the
firm works and the development of the ideas, experience and knowledge of its managers and
entrepreneurs” (Penrose 1959: 85), this expansion will tend to take place in areas of
competence that are close to the firm’s existing areas of competence.
Undeniably, the basic skeleton of some of Penrose’s ideas may be cast in the language of
equilibrium and (dynamic) optimization characteristic of mainstream economics.  For
example, one may argue that at any given point of time there is a set of product market
applications (business areas) that maximize the rents on the firm’s existing resources and
corresponds to an organizational equilibrium (á la Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988), and a
part of the optimization problem are the information costs that the firm’s management team
confronts (Casson 1997).
However, in Penrose’s own view, her theory constituted a powerful critique against certain
aspects of the neoclassical theory of the firm (if not necessarily against neoclassical
economics in general).  In the neoclassical theory of the firm, there is “... no notion of an
internal process of development leading to cumulative movements in any one direction” (1959:
1), a notion that is absolutely crucial for understanding firm development.   Rather, growth is
simply a matter of adjusting to the equilibrium size of the firm.  But if services are produced
endogenously (and continuously) through various intra-firm learning processes involving
16
increased knowledge of resources, “new combinations of resources” (1959: 85), and an
expanding productive opportunity set, there is no equilibrium size.
There is clearly what we today would recognize as a Schumpeterian (change “from within”)
and Veblenian (cumulative causation) flavor to such arguments.  But it is more than a matter
of dressing up arguments in fancy Schumpeterian garb.  Penrose’s basic vision of the
competitive process in general, and of the firm in particular, is disequilibrium-oriented and
subjectivist,14 and, normally overlooked, it stresses entrepreneurship, flexibility, change and
uncertainty.   “In the long run”, Penrose explains,
 “the profitability, survival and growth of a firm does not depend so much on the
efficiency with which it is able to organize the production of even a widely
diversified range of products as it does on the ability of the firm to establish one
or more wide and relatively impregnable ‘bases’ from which it can adapt and
extend its operations in an uncertain, changing and competitive world” (1959:
137).
Thus, seemingly paradoxically, flexibility is just as much a message of the analysis as
specialization is.  The paradox vanishes when it is realized that specialization is specialization
in terms of the underlying resource-base (rather than products) and that such specialization
may be fully consistent with reacting to new business opportunities.  In fact, as Penrose
makes clear, there may be a considerable option value associated with even a specialized
resource-base:
“A firm is basically a collection of resources. Consequently, if we can assume
that businessmen believe there is more to know about the resources they are
working with than they do know at any given time, and that more knowledge
would be likely to improve the efficiency and profitability of their firm, then
unknown and unused productive services immediately become of considerable
importance, not only because the belief that they exist acts as an incentive to
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  Penrose’s subjectivism is particularly apparent in her adoption of Kenneth Boulding’s concept of “the
image”: “... the environment is treated ... as an ‘image’ in the entrepreneur’s mind of the possibilities and
restrictions with which he is confronted, for it is, after all, such an ‘image’ which in fact determines a
man’s behaviour” (1959: 5).  In other words, the environment is basically “enacted” to use Weick’s
terminology.  See also Roberts (1997) for a critique of the inability of resource-based scholars to come to
grips with these aspects of Penrose’s work.
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acquire new knowledge, but also because they shape the scope and direction of
the search for knowledge” (Penrose 1959: 77).
Thus, firm development is essentially an evolutionary and cumulative process of “resource
learning” (Mahoney 1995), in which increased knowledge of the firm’s resources both help
create options for further expansion and increases absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal
1990).  Therefore, a major focus of The Theory of the Growth of the Firm lies in the
application of resources, something that has been missed by many resource-based theorists
who only consider the issues of the terms at which resources were acquired (Barney 1986)
and/or whether they are protected (Peteraf 1993), but forget that it is the actual application,
and not the mere possession, of resources that create revenue (Spender 1994).
To sum up, Penrose’s seminal work is indeed a founding contribution to the RBP.
However, her basic, and too often overlooked, themes − flexibility in an uncertain world,
organizational learning as an evolutionary discovery process, path-dependency, the vision of
the management team, entrepreneurship, etc. − do not seem to square easily with the RBP
(Mark I), that is, the version of the RBP which utilizes equilibrium constructs and builds
directly on price theory.  And it is indeed the contention here that this strand of the RBP
finds its most important source of inspiration, not in the work of Penrose, but rather in the
sort of Chicago-UCLA price theory, notably represented by the work of Harold Demsetz.
B. Harold Demsetz on Industrial Economics
The work of Harold Demsetz (b. 1930) has fallen within a number of economic sub-
disciplines. Thus, he is (with Ronald Coase and Armen Alchian) a pioneer in the development
of the theory of property rights, on the theory of the firm, and an important contributor to
the theory of industrial organization.  He is often thought of as an important member of the
Chicago school of antitrust analysis, although most of his career has taken place at the
University of California, Los Angeles.  Although there is a considerable degree of coherence
to Demsetz’ whole oeuvre, it is primarily in his capacity as a contributor to industrial
organization economics that I shall consider him here.
Much of Demsetz’ work (see, in particular, Demsetz 1974) in this area has been concerned
with critically discussing doctrines developed by economists associated with the so-called
“Structure-Conduct-Performance” school in industrial organization (Bain 1959; Scherer
1980).  According to this school, there is a strong causal flow from the basic structure of an
18
industry (e.g., number of firms, entry barriers), to their conduct (e.g., firms” pricing policies)
to performance (e.g., how large is the deadweight welfare loss).  Specifically, Demsetz has
subjected conventional thinking on entry barriers and on the link between industry structure
and performance to critical scrutiny.  These critical discussions have all been based on the
conviction that models that do not feature information costs − costs of search, of processing
information, of communication, etc. − are likely to seriously distort our understanding of the
industrial landscape, and, in particular to lead policy analysis astray (Demsetz 1969).  On the
other hand, including information costs in economic models, Demsetz argues, will reveal that
many of the practices15 that have traditionally been condemned as monopolistic abuses are in
reality efficiency-enhancing arrangements (Demsetz 1982)
Thus, Demsetz was probably the first economist to develop an understanding of barriers to entry
as essentially informational in nature (and to argue that this understanding should influence
antitrust policies).  For example, advertising has often been singled out as an important (strategic)
entry-barrier. And, in fact, in a model that does not feature information costs, it is difficult to
rationalize advertising as anything else than an instrument that is used in the pursuit of
monopolistic advantages.  But an information cost perspective allows for the understanding that
advertising and brand loyalty are rational responses to an underlying scarcity of information.
Thus, the real entry barrier is not the advertising, but rather the information costs − and it is not all
clear that antitrust authorities should be concerned about these costs.
This focus on information asymmetries and costs as the real entry barriers is clearly related to the
overall resource-based idea that the primary barriers that hinder the equalization of rents across
are informational in nature.16  But there are many other similarities.  In order to elucidate these, I
shall quote extensively from a single paper, namely Demsetz’ 1973 article, “Industry Structure,
Market Rivalry, and Public Policy”.  It is here that we encounter the most explicit anticipations of
what would eventually become the RBP.17  The paper is taken up with discussing the observation
that a concentrated industry structure is often accompanied by high returns. Basically, there are
two hypotheses that may rationalize this.  The first one is that presented by the SCP paradigm: a
high degree of market concentration eases coordination among oligopolists and thereby the
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 Notably various “vertical restraints”.
16
 For example, causal ambiguity,  as in Lippman  and Rumelt (1982).
17
 It should be noted that this paper is often cited in contributions to the RBP,  for example,  Conner   (1991).
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setting of a price approximating the profit-maximizing monopoly price.  The other hypothesis is
essentially an efficiency hypothesis, according to which the co-existence of high returns and high
returns in an industry is caused by more efficient firms growing at the expense of their smaller
rivals, contributing to an increase in concentration, and earning higher returns than these smaller
rivals.   Demsetz tests these two hypotheses in an ingenious way, finds support for the efficiency
hypothesis, and draws the appropriate policy conclusions.
In the beginning of the paper, Demsetz launches one of his favorite themes, namely that
economists have prone to seeking monopoly explanations for virtually all deviations from perfect
competition. However, in a world of uncertainty and positive information costs, many of these
deviations do not reflect monopolistic practices, but efficient responses to scarcity. For example,
advertising and credit rationing are rational practices in a world of positive information costs.
More importantly, the presence of information cost, uncertainty and less-than-fully-mobile factors
may imply that “... a differential advantage in expanding output develops in some firms” (Demsetz
1973: 1).  And the returns (rents) that such differential advantages may yield
“... need not be eliminated soon by competition. It may well be that superior
competitive performance is unique to the firm, viewed as a team, and unobtainable to
others except by purchasing the firm ... The firm may have established a reputation or
goodwill that is difficult to separate from the firm itself ... Or it may be that the
members of the employee team derive their higher productivity from the knowledge
they possess about each other in the environment of the particular firm in which they
work, a source of productivity that may be difficult to transfer piecemeal” (p.2).
Note the emphasis placed on heterogeneity, on different resource-bundles as the sources of
heterogeneity and therefore differential efficiencies that in turn are the basis for differential
competitive advantages.  Note also the emphasis placed on team-effects, such as the learning
effects that arise from the continuity of association between inputs.18
All this is as clear an anticipation of the resource-based emphasis on heterogeneity as the basic
condition of competitive advantage.  But there is more, for Demsetz has also, in the same article,
interesting things to say about what is essentially the resource-based conditions of “ex post limits
to competition” and “ex ante limits to competition” (cf. Section II above).   With respect to the
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  Demsetz (1988) elucidates this and builds a theory of the firm on this basis.  This later paper has also
become a standard reference in the RBP literature.
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former, Demsetz says, in connection with a discussion of the emergence of superior efficiencies,
that
 “One such enterprise happens to “click” for some time while others do not. It may be
very difficult for these firms to understand the reasons for this difference in
performance or to know which inputs to attribute the performance of the successful
firm. It is not easy to ascertain just why G.M. and I.B.M. perform better than their
competitors. The complexity of these organizations defies easy analysis, so that the
inputs responsible for success may be undervalued by the market for some time”
(p.2).
In other words, firms may enjoy long-lived rents because would-imitators confront difficulties
ascertaining “just why” some firms perform better than other, difficulties that are explicitly traced
to “complexity”.   In the last sentence of the above quotation, Demsetz also signals that the
valuation of factors on their relevant markets influences returns.  He goes on to observe that
“...inputs are acquired at historic cost, but the use made of these inputs, including the
managerial inputs, yields only uncertain outcomes. Because the outcomes are
surrounded by uncertainty and are specific to a particular firm at a particular point in
its history, the acquisition cost of inputs may fail to reflect their value to the firm at
some subsequent time. By the time their value to the firm is recognized, they are
beyond acquisition by other firms at the same historic costs, and, in the interim,
shareholders of the successful or lucky firm will have enjoyed higher profit rates”
(p.2).
Per implication, competitive advantage can only be obtained from resources that are acquired at a
price below their discounted present value − the essential point in an important resource-based
paper by Barney (1986) (see also Rumelt (1987) for the same reasoning).   Moreover, certain ex
ante barriers to competition − notably the presence of information costs on input markets − imply
that divergences between the prices of resources and the discounted present value of those
resources may arise.
Sufficient evidence has now been presented to allow us to infer that Demsetz should indeed be
reckoned as among the important precursors of the RBP, particularly with respect to the analysis
of the conditions of sustained competitive advantage, the first key research theme within the RBP.
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In this respect, he is more important than Penrose, for she does not really inquire into these
conditions in her 1959 book.19 An important issue is whether these ideas were first developed
by Demsetz, and then independently discovered by later resource-based strategy theorists.
Or, is there a more direct route through which Demsetz’ ideas may have spread?  In the
following, I argue that there may in fact have been such a direct route.
Jay Barney, who is one of the prime movers behind the emergence of the resource-based
approach in the 1980s, recently argued that the rational reconstruction approach to the history of
the RBP − according to which the development of the RBP can be dated back to Selznick and
Penrose and progressing rather smoothly from there − simply is a “myth” (Barney 1995). Instead,
Barney argued that the modern RBP largely owes its origin to the interaction − mainly at UCLA −
between such economists and strategy scholars as William Ouchi, Michael Porter, Richard
Rumelt, Oliver Williamson, Sidney Winter, and Barney himself.  Only subsequently came the
realization that much of the early work of Selznick, Penrose, Chandler and Andrews anticipated
modern resource-based thought.  Barney’s critique is a welcome warning towards too eagerly
ascribing to older writers views that they only by twisting facts can be seen as anticipating, but it
also leaves out a number of important considerations.20  Space is too limited here, however, to
criticize Barney’s account in detail. Instead, I shall focus on his emphasis on the UCLA
environment.
From the interaction at UCLA emerged two seminal contributions that came to play a founding
role for the emerging RBP (Mark I) in the 1980s.  The first was Lippmann and Rumelt’s 1982
paper, “Uncertain Imitability: An Analysis of Interfirm Differences Under Competition”,  in which
they demonstrate that it is possible to sustain an equilibrium with firms that earn different returns
(rents) (because they have different productive efficiencies) as long as imitation barriers hinder the
equalization of rents across firms.  The intuition of this paper is pure Demsetz, and the paper may
be seen as formalization of key ideas in, for example, Demsetz (1973).  The other seminal paper is
Barney’s 1986 Management Science article on “Strategic Factor Markets”, in which Barney
argues that imperfections in input markets are a necessary condition for competitive advantage;
otherwise, the discounted present value of resources will be fully capitalized in their acquisition
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 On the other hand, Demsetz has had very little to say about Penrose’s major theme, namely firm growth through
efficient diversification.
20
 For example, it neglects David Teece’ s (1980) and Birger Wernerfelt’s (1984) role and the fact that both
Wernerfelt and Teece in their early papers explicitly draw on Penrose’s work.
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price. Again, this a restatement (and extension) of reasoning that was present much earlier in
Demsetz’ work.21
These facts should be combined with the emphasis given in Barney’s account to the UCLA
environment and with the fact that it was in the UCLA economics department that Demsetz
taught while Barney and Rumelt occupied positions in UCLA’s Anderson Graduate School of
Management. Perhaps there was no direct personal influence, but only an exposure on the part of
Barney and Rumelt to a more general UCLA style of doing and thinking of economics − a style
that was also represented by Benjamin Klein and Armen Alchian.22  But the connections are too
obvious to be merely spurious.
IV. Implications for the Resource-Based Perspective
A.  Taking Stock
It is time to take stock on the above discussion.  I have argued, first, that there are two key
themes in the RBP, the analysis of sustained competitive advantage and the analysis of
diversification.  Second, it has been argued that the RBP actually exists in two different
versions, a Mark I and a Mark II version, and that the difference between these is largely a
difference in terms of the extent to which dynamic factors are treated, as in the underlying
analytical frameworks (equilibrium vs evolution).  Third, I have traced the key themes of the
RBP and the two different types of theorizing existing within the RBP to the work of the
two crucial precursors, Penrose and Demsetz. Thus, Demsetz’ influence not only manifests
itself in the equilibrium style of analysis pursued by RBP (Mark I) theorists, but is also
manifest in the way that the theme of sustained competitive advantage is handled within the
RBP.  Penrose’s entirely different and non-neoclassical, non-equilibrium emphasis on
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  What directly prompted the writing of that paper, however, was an earlier paper by Rumelt and Wensley,
“In Search of the Market Share Effect”: “In this paper, Rumelt and Wensley argued that there is a market
for market share, and that this market is quite efficient.  They have a sentence in that article that says
something like ‘this argument, of course, depends on rational expectations’. My 1986 Management
Science article was an effort to understand the implications of this sentence” (Barney, 1996).
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  That is so is indicated by the following comment by Professor Barney: “In terms of the Demsetz
connection, I knew him, but not well. Both Dick [Rumelt]  and Bill Ouchi knew him better. Kathleen
[Conner] knew him pretty well ... We were certainly aware of his work ... Depsite this, I would not say
that Demsetz had a strong personal influence on those of us who were at UCLA. In fact, if anyone had
this influence, it was Armen Alchian ... While the personal Demsetz connection was not there (at least for
me), there is no doubt that the equilibrium approach used by Demsetz and Alchian was a very strong
influence at UCLA ... if economically oriented faculty wanted to have any credibility at all at UCLA, they
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learning, vision, entrepreneurship, flexibility, etc., on the other hand,  is clearly manifest in
the RBP (Mark II), that is, the work that has to a large extent taken its cue from the work of
Prahalad and Hamel.  In other words, Demsetz and Penrose’s seminal and widely different
work have laid the foundations for diverging paths of development within the RBP.  This
may be interesting as a matter of intellectual history; but what does it matter to the future
development of the RBP, not to speak of practical concerns?
B. Implications
The Demsetz influence on the RBP (Mark I), I have argued, helped align strategy and
economic equilibrium. As Spender (1993: 42) noted in a related context, “The notion of rents
is simply a way of bringing the homogeneity of economic thought together with the
heterogeneity of the real world”. For example, if information costs are positive, we can have
an equilibrium with firms of different efficiencies and rents (and therefore different
competitive advantages), and we can perform the usual comparative static exercises in this
setting (Demsetz 1973, 1989b; Lippman and Rumelt 1982).  Moreover, equilibrium, in the
eyes of writers such as Barney, is a useful benchmark, one that can be used for analyzing
factor market imperfections and sustained competitive advantage.  The latter, recall, is
defined as the advantage that lasts after all attempts at imitation have ceased (Barney 1991: 102).
So a sort of zero imitation, Nash equilibrium is utilized as a yardstick to define and understand
(sustained) competitive advantage.
While it cannot be denied that in some ways the alignment of equilibrium and strategy has proven
fruitful, it should also be recognized that it made difficult the incorporation of the Penrosian legacy
− with its emphasis on organizational learning, entrepreneurship, etc. − in the more formal,
economics-inspired body of resource-based thought.   The result has been the emergence of what
has here been called the Mark I and Mark II versions of the RBP, with the latter addressing the
more dynamic issues of resource-creation, but doing so in such broad and sometimes diffuse terms
that their real contribution to the furthering of the RBP may be questionable.
As a result of this dichotomization of resource-based research, there is clearly a lack of a clear and
coherent treatment of dynamic factors: while the RBP (Mark II) does address dynamic issues, it
does so in rather diffuse and incoherent terms, and while the RBP (Mark I) is clear and coherent,
there is no real treatment of dynamics.   Therefore, the RBP does not in its present version(s)
                                                                                                                                               
had to do equilibrium kind of analyses − because of the standards set by Demsetz, Alchian and Klein.
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adequately theorize the mechanisms underlying the creation of new resources − a feature that
tends to give the perspective a distinctly retrospective orientation.  More specifically, the
perspective cannot adequately frame questions relating to corporate renewal, organizational
learning, resource-building, etc.  It is true, of course, that the RBP (Mark I) can to a limited
extent frame such questions by treating, for example, capabilities for corporate renewal as
rare, hard to imitate, etc., so that these capabilities are seen as strategic resources. But this ex
post analysis is clearly begging the normative and practical issue of how firms may build such
capabilities.  This problem is arguably particularly troublesome for the future evolution of the
RBP, for dynamics (broadly conceived) is all the rage in the strategy (and organizational behavior)
field(s) these days, as witness the recent enthusiasm about “hyper-competition”, “organizational
learning”, “the knowledge-creating company”, etc.
The underlying problem in this context is that there is no clear conceptual model or models of the
endogenous creation of new resources to be found in the RBP.  The same critique that Penrose
directed against the neoclassical theory of the firm is also applicable to the RBP: there is “... no
notion of an internal process of development leading to cumulative movements in any one
direction” (1959: 1), Thus, while Demsetz (1973), Lippman and Rumelt (1982), and Barney
(1986) provide a theory of rents in equilibrium, they actually tell us very little about how the
heterogeneous conditions underlying differential rents arise.
Clearly, this has something to do with the role of equilibrium and the restrictive behavioral
assumptions that normally accompany equilibrium models (such as admitting only maximizing
rationality) in this sort of work.  As many writers, including Penrose, have pointed out, a too firm
commitment to equilibrium and optimization may seriously impede the development of models of
endogenous change.  Learning, innovation and entrepreneurial discovery activities involve per
definition novelties in the sense of the acquisition or creation of novel knowledge − and such
novelties are quite simply hard to force into an equilibrium straitjacket (Loasby 1991).  Thus, one
important reason why the RBP lacks a clear model of the endogenous creation of resources may
simply be that equilibrium economics of the Demsetz variety has been such an important force in
the development of the RBP.  Instead, theorists have fallen back on what we may call “Big Bang
Theories of Competitive Advantages” (Spender 1993: 45): competitive advantage is rationalized
by pointing to an initial, unexplained event, such as sheer luck.
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C. Remedies
What the RBP needs, in the view taken here, is more agreement that the dynamic issues featured
in such contributions as Prahalad and Hamel (1990) are crucial, that they should be approached in
a more precise and analytical way, that economics may prove useful, but also that equilibrium and
maximization may not always be the best tools for framing strategic issues.  If this agreement does
not obtain, there is a real danger that the RBP may split even more visibly, first, into a formal,
stark, abstract branch strongly inspired by economics and gradually losing contact with managerial
reality, and, second, an increasingly loose and free-wheeling branch where almost anything goes
on the analytical level.
In general, it has been argued, there is a need for bringing process issues more directly into the
focus of the RBP, and much of the neglect of such issues has to do with the influence of
equilibrium economics on the RBP.   Accordingly, it appears to be natural to turn towards
economic theories that address process/disequilibrium issues, or, what may be called “market
process theories”.
This is the approach taken by  several of the contributors to this book; for example, Peter Roberts
(1997), who rely on arguments from Austrian economics and emphasize the quality of
entrepreneurial alertness (Kirzner 1973).  Like Kirzner today, Penrose argued that “... the decision
to search for opportunities is an enterprising decision requiring entrepreneurial intuition and
imagination and must precede the ‘economic’ decision to go ahead with the examination of
opportunities” (1959: 34).  In such a view, it is misleading to reduce competitive advantage to
luck or asymmetric information and to think of sustainability as a matter of the persistence of rents
in equilibrium.  Rather, sustainability becomes (also) a matter of continuous alertness to a stream
of disequilibrium opportunities for profit.  However, as argued elsewhere in more detail (Foss
1996a), it is ironic that Austrian economics, as a theory about the market process, has so very
little to say about the arguably most important constituent element of the market process, namely
the firm.
A processual approach that spans several level of analysis, including notably that of the firm,
is evolutionary economics, which Metcalfe (1997) argues is able to further the RBP (see also
Montgomery 1995; Foss 1996a; Teece et al. 1997).  For example, evolutionary economics
and the RBP (in both versions) are both characterized by emphasizing the fundamental
heterogeneity of firms as a necessary starting-point for theorizing, but, in contrast to the
RBP (at least in its Mark I version), evolutionary economics endogenizes the sources of
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heterogeneity.  For example, evolutionary economists have cultivated an advanced
understanding of the mechanisms of technological change − insights that may both help
develop a more refined resource-based analysis of the environment and increase our
understanding of the process of creation of new resources through innovation.   Thus,
notions such as “technological paradigms”, “regimes”, “technology systems”, etc. provide an
understanding of the environmental forces that changes the distribution of returns over time.
V. Conclusions
Any theoretical perspective carries with it an open horizon in the sense that we cannot exactly
know in advance how the perspective will fare with respect to future problem-solving.  However,
where a perspective will go is constrained by where it has been in the past.  In this chapter, I have
argued that the influences of (the) two central precursors of the RBP have resulted in a split
within the RBP in an economics-oriented and equilibrium-based version (Mark I), which reflects
the influence of Harold Demsetz, and a disequilibrium-oriented version, which owes much more
to the influence of Edith Penrose (Mark II).
Furthermore, the argument has been that unless a sort of alignment between these two different
versions of the RBP is accomplished, there is a risk that they will develop even more strongly in
their own distinct directions, the equilibrium branch becoming increasingly formal (possibly
mathematical) and oriented towards mainstream economics,  while the process oriented branch
will increasingly draw on “softer” ideas and disciplines.   As several contributions to this book
indicate, this alignment may arguably be accomplished by drawing on Austrian and/or
evolutionary economics, and by relating to work on organizational learning and technological
innovation and change.
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The Research Programme
The DRUID-research programme is organised in 3 different research themes:
- The firm as a learning organisation
- Competence building and inter-firm dynamics
- The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation
In each of the three areas there is one strategic theoretical and one central empirical and
policy oriented orientation.
Theme A: The firm as a learning organisation  
The theoretical perspective confronts and combines the ressource-based view (Penrose,
1959) with recent approaches where the focus is on learning and the dynamic capabilities of
the firm (Dosi, Teece and Winter, 1992). The aim of this theoretical work is to develop an
analytical understanding of the firm as a learning organisation.
The empirical and policy issues relate to the nexus technology, productivity, organisational
change and human ressources. More insight in the dynamic interplay between these factors at
the level of the firm is crucial to understand international differences in performance at the
macro level in terms of economic growth and employment.
Theme B: Competence building and inter-firm dynamics
The theoretical perspective relates to the dynamics of the inter-firm division of labour and
the formation of network relationships between firms. An attempt will be made to develop
evolutionary models with Schumpeterian innovations as the motor driving a Marshallian
evolution of the division of labour.
The empirical and policy issues relate the formation of knowledge-intensive regional and
sectoral networks of firms to competitiveness and structural change. Data on the structure of
production will be combined with indicators of knowledge and learning. IO-matrixes which
include flows of knowledge and new technologies will be developed and supplemented by
data from case-studies and questionnaires.
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Theme C: The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation.
The third theme aims at a stronger conceptual and theoretical base for new concepts such as
'systems of innovation' and 'the learning economy' and to link these concepts to the
ecological dimension. The focus is on the interaction between institutional and technical
change in a specified geographical space. An attempt will be made to synthesise theories of
economic development emphasising the role of science based-sectors with those emphasising
learning-by-producing and the growing knowledge-intensity of all economic activities.
The main empirical and policy issues are related to changes in the local dimensions of
innovation and learning. What remains of the relative autonomy of national systems of
innovation? Is there a tendency towards convergence or divergence in the specialisation in
trade, production, innovation and in the knowledge base itself when we compare regions and
nations?
The Ph.D.-programme
There are at present more than 10 Ph.D.-students working in close connection to the
DRUID research programme. DRUID organises regularly specific Ph.D-activities such as
workshops, seminars and courses, often in a co-operation with other Danish or international
institutes. Also important is the role of DRUID as an environment which stimulates the
Ph.D.-students to become creative and effective. This involves several elements:
- access to the international network in the form of visiting fellows and visits at the   sister
institutions
- participation in research projects
- access to supervision of theses
- access to databases
Each year DRUID welcomes a limited number of foreign Ph.D.-students who wants to work
on subjects and project close to the core of the DRUID-research programme.
External projects
DRUID-members are involved in projects with external support. One major project which
covers several of the elements of the research programme is DISKO; a comparative analysis
of the Danish Innovation System; and there are several projects involving international co-
operation within EU's 4th Framework Programme. DRUID is open to host other projects as
far as they fall within its research profile. Special attention is given to the communication of
research results from such projects to a wide set of social actors and policy makers.
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